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ARGUMENT 
I. THE IMPROPER COMMENTS OF THE PROSECUTOR REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
A. The Prosecutor's Emphasis Of Dunn's Request For An 
Attorney Requires Reversal. 
Improper comments by a prosecutor require reversal when the 
record shows that the jury was sufficiently likely to be 
influenced by the remarks "to undermine confidence in the ver-
dict." State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). 
The State suggests that the prosecutor's reference in his 
closing argument to Mr. Dunn's request for a lawyer was com-
pletely proper because Mr. Dunn was not yet in custody and had 
not yet been charged with a crime. 
In fact, although Mr. Dunn had not yet been read his Miranda 
rights, the evidence shows that he was in police custody at the 
time he asked for a lawyer. After the motorhome was stopped by 
police, one officer asked Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott to step out of 
the car. P. 236. While one officer searched the motorhome, 
another officer was guarding Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott with a sawed-
off shotgun. P. 235. Mr. Dunn's request for an attorney was in 
response to a question from the officer regarding the dead body. 
Immediately after the request for an attorney, both Mr. Dunn and 
Mr. Scott were subjected to a pat-down search and handcuffed. P. 
240. The police had just discovered Mr. Sprinkle's dead body in 
1 
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the motorhome Mr. Dunn was driving. Mr. Dunn was on the verge of | 
arrest even if he had not officially been taken into custody. 
The State cites to Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685 
(1988) and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) for the ( 
proposition that no Fifth or Sixth Amendment concerns attach to 
any precustodial activity. The State is wrong. In fact, the 
Court in Kirby explicitly states: ( 
[w]hat has been said is not to suggest that 
there may not be occasions during the course 
of a criminal investigation when the police 
do abuse identification procedures. Such 
abuses are not beyond the reach of the con- { 
stitution. As the Court pointed out in Wade 
itself, it is always necessary to "scru-
tinize" any pretrial confrontation. 
406 U.S. at 690-91 (emphasis in original). Further, the Court in 
A 
Kirby specifically noted that the defendant had not requested an 
attorney at the time of the investigatory lineup which was the 
subject of the dispute in that case. Thus, the State's conten-
1 
tion that no constitutional concerns are invoked by precustodial 
activity is incorrect. In this case, Mr. Dunn had been stopped 
by the police, he was being held at gunpoint by one officer and 
i 
another officer had just discovered Mr. Sprinkle's dead body in 
the motorhome Mr. Dunn was driving. He was in custody even if he 
had not yet been read his Miranda rights. 
. • . • • . ( 
Roberson dealt with the suppression of evidence, not with 
the propriety of a prosecutor's attempt to associate a request 
for an attorney with a defendant's guilt or innocence. Roberson 
2 
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does not stand for the proposition that a prosecutor may use a 
precustodial request for counsel to imply a defendant's guilt. 
While it may be permissible for a prosecutor to comment on a 
defendant's exercise of a constitutional right when intended to 
rebut or impeach a claim made by the defendant, in this case, the 
State went far beyond that. The State now claims the prosecutor 
was attempting to prove Mr. Dunn's state of mind at the time of 
his arrest. In closing argument, the prosecutor's version of the 
arrest scene was: 
Officer Larson found the body and walked up 
to him and said, "What can you tell me about 
the body back there?" What does Mr. Dunn 
say? "I want a lawyer. I want a lawyer." Is 
that a scared man? Is that a man that's so 
frightened of Howard Scott that he doesn't 
know what to do or how to get away? "I want 
a lawyer." 
In fact, Officer Larson testified that he asked Mr. Dunn, 
"What can you tell me about the guy in the motorhome?" and that 
Mr. Dunn replied, "I want a lawyer. All I was told to do was 
drive." T. 269-270. 
Compared to Mr. Dunn's actual comments, the excerpt chosen 
by the prosecutor demonstrates that the State's intent was to 
convey more than Mr. Dunn's state of mind. The prosecutor re-
peated Mr. Dunn's request for counsel three times but failed to 
repeat the rest of Mr. Dunn's statement. In fact, the request 
for counsel on its own is inaccurate in the impression it conveys 
about Mr. Dunn's state of mind at the time of the arrest. The 
3 
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I 
addition of his exculpatory statement, "All I was told to do was 
drive" puts the exchange in a different light. The prosecutor 
used the excuse of impeachment to push the jury toward the im-
proper conclusion that a guilty man would not ask for a lawyer. 
Further, two of the cases cited by the State deal with the 
admission of evidence, not with its use in a closing argument. 
In State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 375 (Utah 1982), this Court 
found no error in cross examination by a prosecutor who forced 
the defendant to admit he had an opportunity to tell his story to 
the police but failed to do so. This followed testimony by the 
defendant that, "I haven't had a chance to say anything before to 
try and prove my innocence." Id. Similarly, in Fletcher v. Weir, 
455 U.S. 603 (1982), the United States Supreme Court found proper 
cross examination of a defendant in a murder trial who testified 
that he stabbed the victim in self-defense. The prosecutor 
cross-examined the defendant as to why he never told the ar- { 
resting officers this story. ^d. at 604. Again, the prosecu-
tor's comments here went much farther. Unlike the cases cited, 
the prosecutor in this case repeated Mr. Dunn's request for a 
lawyer three times and failed to accurately present the request 
in context. Whether or not Mr. Dunn's statement should have been 
admitted, it was constitutionally improper for his request for 
counsel to be emphasized by the prosecutor in the manner that 
occurred here. 
'"• - . • ' , ' • " . ' . „ ' • " ' ' . . . ' • : •-.., .. • ^ . : ; l 
• •
 v :
 • ' . 4 
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B. Prosecutorial Reference To Factors Outside The 
Evidence Requires Reversal. 
At the start of his closing argument, the prosecutor 
improperly suggested that the jury's concern for the well-being 
of society should override their obligation to acquit Mr. Dunn i 
they had a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. While defense 
counsel failed to object, the argument constituted plain error 
and is sufficient to mandate reversal by this Court. 
The State mischaracterizes the nature of the comments made 
by the prosecutor in his closing arguments. The prosecutor did 
not simply ask the jury to convict for the good of the community 
or fairness to society. Rather the prosecutor said, "Make sure 
before you determine that there is reasonable doubt, make sure 
that before you elevate some of the concerns to the point of a 
reasonable doubt, that you are being fair to the most important 
segment of society at large." T. 549. Unlike the arguments in 
the cases cited by the State, the prosecutor here specifically 
suggested that concern for society should override the jury's 
obligation not to convict if they had a reasonable doubt about 
Mr. Dunn's guilt. The prosecutor's comments were improper. 
This Court may take "notice of plain errors affecting sub-
stantial rights although they were not brought to the attention 
of the court." Utah R. Evid. 103(d). The plain error standard 
requires the reviewing court to make two findings: 
First, the error must be "plain" or "mani-
fest." This is sometimes termed an "obvi-
5' 
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i 
ousness" requirement. After examining the 
record, an appellate court must be able to 
say "that it should have been obvious to a 
trial court that it was committing error." 
Second, the error must be of sufficient mag-
nitude that it affects the substantial rights 
of a party. In other words . . . the appel-
lant must show a reasonable likelihood that 
absent the error, the outcome below would 
have been more favorable. 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989) (citations and 
footnotes omitted). Both elements are present here. The prose-
cutor's remarks were clearly erroneous: the jury should have 
been limited in its deliberations to evidence presented at trial, 
State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1986); and, the jury 
had an obligation to acquit Mr. Dunn if it had a reasonable doubt 
as to his guilt. Id.1 
Contrary to the State's unsupported assertion, this improper 
argument likely had an impact on the jury. Mr. Dunn was con-
victed based largely on circumstantial evidence. As this Court 
noted in Andreason, "When the evidence in the record is circum-
stantial or sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely 
influenced by an improper argument. In such instances, they are 
more susceptible to the suggestion that factors other than the 
evidence before them should determine a defendant's guilt or 
innocence." Id. at 403. Thus, a suggestion that the jury should 
1
 The failure of defense counsel to object further demon-
strates the ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial. ( 
See Point VI of Opening Brief of Appellant. 
6 
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consider factors outside the evidence may have contributed 
heavily to the jury's decision to convict Mr. Dunn. Other than 
the inherently incredible testimony by Scott, the admitted trig-
german, see pp. 23-27, infra, there was no direct evidence that 
Mr. Dunn participated in the crime. As a result, the improper 
argument by the prosecutor was more likely than not an influence 
on the jury's decision. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S REVERSAL OF ITS PRETRIAL RULING EXCLUDING 
MR. DUNN'S PRIOR CONVICTION WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL AND 
REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
In response to Mr. Dunn's contention that the trial court 
improperly admitted evidence of his prior felony conviction, the 
State argues that the conviction was admissible under the law 
then in effect. This argument misses the point. The record 
shows that the district court ruled before trial that the convic-
tion would not be received except for purposes of impeaching 
character evidence. The court's admission of the conviction, 
after Mr. Dunn took the witness stand without adducing character 
evidence in reliance on that pretrial ruling, was improper and 
unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Dunn. 
In its brief, the State quotes only a small portion of the 
court's lengthy pretrial discussion of Mr. Dunn's motion to 
exclude the conviction. From a reading of all of the relevant 
portions of the trial transcript, however, it is clear that 
before trial the court ruled the conviction inadmissible except 
7 
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i 
for purposes of impeaching character evidence, but reversed that 
ruling after Mr. Dunn had already taken the stand in reliance on 
the pretrial ruling.2 
Before trial the court considered the conviction presump-
tively inadmissible. The following exchange between defense 
counsel and the court is particularly revealing: 
THE COURT: I kind of hate to -- if he [the 
prosecutor] just brings it in and wants to 
put on the evidence/ boom — of this prior 
conviction, Iym not going to allow it because 
I don't think it's admissible and I think our 
rules say that it is not admissible, but in 
the alternative, if your client gets on the 
stand and you paint him as a character with-
out blemish, you see what I mean, and it gets 
into that, then I think the prosecution has a 
right to go into it and I think he has the 
right. But what Ifm really saying is that I 
can't really rule on that until I get to the 
posture of the case where it comes out, but 
if he's attempting to use it as evidence of 
the commission of this crime, I'm not going 
to allow. 
Now, do you follow what I'm saying? 
MR. TAYLOR: I think I do, Your Honor, and I 
do agree with the Court that that conviction 
can come in through cross-examination or 
rebuttal as to defeat, or impeach or rebut in 
character, as evidence, if the Defendant 
presents it. 
THE COURT: That's right. So, I don't see 
where we've got a problem. Am I wrong? 
MR. TAYLOR: But other than that, I think the 
Court should rule that it is inadmissible. 
2
 A copy of the transcript of the entire pretrial hearing on 
the motion to exclude and of the related hearing that occurred 
after Mr. Dunn testified is attached to this Brief as Addendum A. 
8 
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THE COURT: That's what I think I said; isn't 
it? 
T. 236-237 (emphasis added). Later, when the prosecutor sought 
to introduce evidence of the conviction on cross-examination of 
Mr. Dunn, defense counsel reiterated his understanding of the 
Court's pretrial ruling, stating, "Well, the Court ruled at the 
beginning of the trial that it can come in if it's in rebuttal of 
character evidence. We haven't presented any character evi-
dence." T. 444. Nevertheless, the court received evidence of 
the conviction. 
The State apparently contends that the court's pretrial 
ruling went no further than to exclude the conviction from the 
prosecutor's case-in-chief. While the court did state it would 
not rule in advance on the admissibility of the conviction after 
the State had presented its case-in-chief, that remark must be 
viewed in light of the discussion that immediately preceded it, 
quoted above, in which defense counsel sought clarification of 
the court's ruling and the court confirmed that the conviction 
was not admissible except to impeach character evidence. The 
court's statement reserving its ultimate ruling on the admis-
sibility of the conviction merely reflects the fact that the 
court could not determine whether Mr. Dunn had placed his char-
acter in issue until after Mr. Dunn had testified. 
9 
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That the court initially held the conviction inadmissible 
except to impeach character evidence is further demonstrated by 
the court's discussion of the relevant law. Before trial, the 
court appears to have relied exclusively on Utah R. Evid. 55 and 
federal cases interpreting the corresponding Fed. R. Evid. 
609(a)3 under which the conviction would have been excluded 
unless its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. 
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359-69 (D.C. Cir. 1976).4 
During argument on the motion before trial, the court referred 
3
 Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) states: 
For the purposes of attacking the credibility 
of a witness, evidence that he has been con-
victed of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from him or established by public 
record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law under which he was convicted, and the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prej-
udicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, re-
gardless of the punishment. 
4In so doing, the court was merely a few years ahead of its 
time. In 1983, in recognition of the overwhelming risk that a jury 
will improperly consider a prior conviction as evidence of guilt 
of the later charge, the Utah rule was modified to agree with the 
federal rule. Utah R. Evid. 609(a); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1986). Under current Utah law, Mr. Dunn's prior conviction 
clearly should have been excluded. The prior conviction occurred 
in 1973 and was for the crime of assault with a deadly weapon 
arising from the abduction of a young woman. Given the remoteness 
of the offense and its similarity to the kidnapping charge at 
issue, it would have been reversible error to admit the conviction. 
Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335. 
10 
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only to "Rule 55"5 (T. 235, lines 6-17) and the "United States 
cases" (T. 235, line 30 -T. 236, line 6). No mention was made by 
either the court or counsel of Utah R. Evid. 21, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-24-9 (1977) or State v. Bennett, 517 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1973), 
cert, denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974), under which the conviction may 
have been admissible. T. 234-38. Only after Mr. Dunn testified 
did the prosecutor cite State v. Bennett to the court. It was on 
that basis that the court reversed its pretrial ruling and re-
ceived the conviction without requiring that it rebut character 
evidence. T. 444-45. Thus, even assuming that the court could 
properly have ruled the conviction admissible before trial, the 
fact of the matter is that it did not. 
Admission of the conviction after Mr. Dunn had already taken 
the stand in reliance upon the court's express assurance that the 
conviction would be excluded unless he placed his character in 
issue was unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Dunn. Mr. Dunn had the 
right to remain silent and, had he done so, evidence of the prior 
5Utah R. Evid. 55, which was repealed in 1983, stated as 
follows: 
Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person committed 
a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is 
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime or 
civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he 
committed another crime or civil wrong on another 
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such 
evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other 
material fact including absence of mistake or accident, 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge 
or identity. 
11 
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< 
conviction would not have been presented to the jury. Defense ( 
counsel sought a pretrial ruling on admissibility of the convic-
tion to be able to weigh the risk <pf not having Mr, Dunn testify 
against the risk of having the conviction admitted. Had he known ( 
the conviction would be received, Mr. Dunn could have chosen to 
exercise his right not to testify, or, at a minimum, attempted to 
explain the circumstances of the conviction during direct 4 
examination thereby blunting the impact on the jury of the cross-
examination on the conviction. 
The court compounded the prejudice to Mr. Dunn by also < 
erroneously allowing, over defense counsel's objection, cross-
examination not only as to the fact of the conviction and the 
name of the crime, but also as to the circumstances surrounding i 
the crime. T. 446. Even under the then existing law, such 
cross-examination was improper. State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 
269, 382 P.2d 407, 409 (1963); Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile ( 
Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 326 n. 14 (Utah 1979), overruled on other 
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Co., 678 P.2d 298 (1984). The prior 
conviction in question - assault with a deadly weapon — stemmed < 
from the abduction of a young woman. T. 447. Thus, it was 
highly similar to the kidnapping charge at issue and particularly 
V < 
' i 
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susceptible of being used to inflame the jury and to support an 
improper inference of guilt on the kidnapping charge.6 
The similarity of a prior conviction to the crime charged is 
extremely prejudicial and the improper admission of such a con-
viction is reversible error. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1335 (Utah 1986).7 This Court should reverse Mr. Dunn's convic-
tion and grant a new trial. 
III. THE CHARGE OF RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER IS INAPPROPRIATE UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, REGARDLESS OF THE GROUND ON WHICH 
DUNN'S SECOND DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION IS REVERSED. 
A. The Charge Of Reckless Manslaughter Is Inappro-
priate Under The Facts Of This Case. 
The State confesses error in Dunn's conviction for second 
degree murder, albeit on different grounds from those raised by 
Dunn. State's Br. at 24-29. The State correctly points out that 
the instruction given to the jury on second degree murder was 
erroneous because it improperly included the term "recklessly" in 
the definition of "depraved indifference" murder. The State 
further concedes that the incorrect instruction constituted plain 
error which cannot be considered harmless because the evidence 
against Dunn was not overwhelming. State's Br. at 28-29. In 
6No limiting instruction was given to the jury concerning the 
prior conviction. T. 531-548. 
7Although Banner was decided under the current rules of 
evidence, the principle for which it is cited here, i.e., that the 
improper admission of a prior conviction similar to the crime 
charged is reversible error, is validly applied to the admission 
of such a conviction that was erroneous under prior law. 
13 
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raising yet another serious defect in the trial, the State lends 
convincing support to Dunn's basic contention that the pro-
ceedings against him were so replete with error that his convic-
tions must be reversed. 
In an attempt to salvage a homicide conviction out of those 
flawed proceedings, the State now requests this Court to enter a 
conviction against Dunn for reckless manslaughter.8 The State 
expressly concedes, however, that the evidence in support of 
Dunn's second degree murder conviction is "not overwhelming." 
Id. Since double jeopardy principles do not bar a retrial where 
a conviction is reversed for trial error rather than insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, the usual procedure where a conviction is 
reversed for an erroneous jury instruction is to grant a new 
trial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Greene v. 
Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978). Thus, in seeking a conviction on the 
lesser offense of reckless manslaughter rather than a new trial 
on the second degree murder charge, the State impliedly admits 
8The State attempts to avoid consideration of the merits of 
thi issue by contending that Mr. Dunn has waived any challenge to 
a manslaughter conviction. Inasmuch as Mr. Dunn was not convicted 
of manslaughter, he certainly cannot have waived a challenge to 
such a conviction. The manslaughter issue is a new matter raised 
by the State and is, as such, properly addressed in this Reply 
Brief. See, Utah R. App. P. 24(c). 
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that the evidence against Dunn is indeed insufficient to support 
his conviction.9 
Where a conviction is reversed on the ground of the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence, this Court may enter a conviction for a 
lesser included offense only if the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1990) are satisfied. That section reads: 
If the district court on motion after 
verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that 
there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that 
there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included 
offense, the verdict or judgment of convic-
tion may be set aside or reversed and a judg-
ment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if 
such relief is sought by the defendant. 
Dunn has not sought the alternative relief of a reckless 
manslaughter conviction.10 Thus, Section 76-1-402(5) is inap-
plicable here. 
9As discussed at p. 21, infra, the insufficiency in the 
evidence is on the issue of Dunn's mens rea. Therefore, this 
admission logically also applies to the aggravated kidnapping 
conviction, despite the State's argument that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the conviction on that offense. 
10
 In State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989), this Court 
found the requirement that the defendant seek the relief of a 
conviction on a lesser included offense to be met by the defen-
dant's request for a jury instruction on that offense. Id. at 
1219, n.20. Here, Dunn did not request an instruction on reckless 
manslaughter. See, Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions 
included in the Supplemental Record on this appeal. 
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Moreover, as shown below, the charge of reckless man-
slaughter is fundamentally inconsistent with both the evidence 
and the prosecution's own theory of the case at trial. Thus, if 
this Court finds the evidence insufficient to support Dunn's 
second degree murder conviction, the appropriate remedy is re-
versal. Even if, despite the State's admission, this Court 
should reverse the conviction solely on the ground of the 
erroneous jury instruction, the appropriate remedy would be to 
grant a new trial. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(l)(a) (1978), one is guilty 
of reckless manslaughter if he or she "recklessly causes the 
death of another." Section 76-2-103(3) (1978) provides that a 
person acts recklessly: 
when he is aware of but consciously disre-
gards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such nature 
and degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise under 
all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
To convict Dunn of reckless manslaughter based upon his own 
conduct, Dunn must have (1) committed a reckless act which (2) 
caused the death of Sprinkle. The evidence was undisputed, 
however, that Sprinkle died, not from any act of Dunn, but only 
from the acts of Scott. Certainly, none of the acts the State 
alleged Dunn committed in aid of the homicide — i.e., driving 
the motorhome and, according to Scott's testimony only, assisting 
16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Scott in tying up Sprinkle and telling Scott to shoot Sprinkle — 
caused Sprinkle's death. Rather, both the defense and prosecu-
tion agreed that Howard Scott intentionally shot and killed 
Sprinkle. Thus, Dunn cannot be convicted of reckless man-
slaughter based upon his own conduct alone, however reckless it 
may have been. 
This Court has repeatedly held that a manslaughter instruc-
tion is inappropriate where the defendants theory of the case 
was that the defendant himself did not cause the victim's death. 
See, e.g., State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983) (man-
slaughter instruction not required where defendants sought 
acquittal on second degree murder charge on basis of failure to 
prove that they caused the victim's death); State v. Shabata, 678 
P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984) (manslaughter conviction inappropriate 
where defense is that defendant did not kill victim); see also 
State v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah App. 1990) (where 
defendant testified that someone else shot victim, there was no 
rational basis in the evidence for reckless manslaughter charge). 
Here, as in Crick and Shabata, it was the defense theory that 
Dunn himself did not engage in any act that caused Sprinkle's 
death. More importantly, however, this was the prosecution's 
theory as well. The prosecution contended Dunn was liable only 
as an accomplice. Thus, there was no rational basis in the 
17 
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evidence for a reckless manslaughter charge against Dunn based 
upon his own conduct alone. 
Neither can Dunn be convicted of reckless manslaughter as an 
accomplice. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990), defines an 
accomplice as: 
[a] person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense . . 
., who solicits, requests, commands, encour-
ages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense. 
Under section 76-2-202, "the test for determining whether a 
person is an accomplice to a crime is whether the person could be 
charged with the same crime as the [principal]." (Emphasis 
added.) See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1219-20 (Utah 
1986); State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977). Here, the crime com-
mitted by Howard Scott was an intentional homicide. Thus, to be 
guilty as an accomplice, Dunn must have acted with a mental state 
that would subject him to liability for that crime, i.e., intent 
to cause death or serious bodily harm. A merely reckless state 
of mind does not suffice. 
Indeed, the words "solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids" contained in section 76-2-202 imply that 
an intent to bring about the criminal result is always an 
essential element of accomplice liability. Interpreting a 
similar federal provision and its predecessors, Judge Learned 
18 
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Hand reached this conclusion in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 
401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938): 
It will be observed that all these def-
initions have nothing whatever to do with the 
probability that the forbidden result would 
follow upon the accessory's conduct; and that 
they all demand that he in some sort asso-
ciate himself with the venture, that he par-
ticipate in it as in something he wishes to 
bring about, that he seek by his action to 
make it succeed. All the words used - even 
the most colorless, "abet" - carry an impli-
cation of purposive attitude towards it. 
Thus, the Second Circuit in Peoni reversed a conviction for 
possession of counterfeit money where the evidence showed that 
the alleged accomplice merely knew, rather than intended, that 
the money was likely to be resold to (and thus unlawfully pos-
sessed by) the principal. See also Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 
(Alaska 1973) (criminal intent is required element of aiding and 
abetting arson); State v. Schriner, 215 Kan. 86, 523 P.2d 703 
(1984) (conviction reversed where jury instructions failed to 
indicate that defendant must share intent to kidnap); In re 
Wilson, 91 Wash.2d 487, 588 P.2d 1161 (1979) (conviction of 
juvenile reversed where lower court failed to find intentional 
participation in criminal acts). . 
Similarly, in People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 199 Cal. 
Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318 (1984), the court reversed a conviction 
for robbery where the defendant had assisted others with know-
ledge that they intended to rob jewelry from his aunt. After 
19 
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discussing prior California law, the court stated: 
Thus, we conclude that the weight of autho-
rity and sound law require proof that an 
aider and abettor act with knowledge of the 
criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with 
an intent or purpose either of committing, or 
of encouraging or facilitating commission of, 
the offense. 
Id. at 1325 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Continu-
ing, the court stated:
 v 
When the definition of the offense in-
cludes the intent to do some act or achieve 
some consequence beyond the actus reus of the 
crime, the aider and abettor must share the 
specific intent of the perpetrator. By 
"share" we mean neither that the aider and 
abettor must be prepared to commit the 
offense by his or her own act should the 
perpetrator fail to do so, nor that the aider 
and abettor must seek to share the fruits of 
the crime. Rather, an aider and abettor will 
"share" the perpetrator's specific intent 
when he or she knows the full extent of the 
perpetrator's criminal purpose and gives aid 
or encouragement with the intent or purpose 
of facilitating the perpetrator's commission 
of the crime. 
Id. at 1326 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Where as in 
this case the underlying offense is an intentional murder, an 
accomplice must share that intent.11 Thus, Mr. Dunn cannot be 
nIn deciding this case, this Court need not reach the issue 
of whether accomplice liability may ever be based on a mental state 
less culpable than an intent to cause the result. While in some 
jurisdictions, such liability is precluded altogether, see, e.g., 
State v. Etzweiler, 125 N.H. 57, 480 A.2d 870 (1984) (no liability 
as an accomplice for negligent homicide), where such liability has 
been imposed, the principal was also negligent or reckless. See, 
e.g., Missouri v. Fennewald, 339 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1960) (accomplice 
liability appropriate where defendant participated in high speed 
auto race on public street and resulting collision involving other 
20 
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convicted of reckless manslaughter as an accomplice of Mr. Scott, 
an intentional killer. 
B. The Evidence Is Insufficient To Support A Convic-
tion For Either Second Degree Murder Or Reckless 
Manslaughter. 
Even if a reckless manslaughter charge were theoretically 
applicable to this case, the evidence would be just as deficient 
to support a verdict on that charge as on the second degree 
murder charge. When all is said and done, the State must rely 
heavily on the testimony of Howard Scott to support a conviction 
on any criminal charge against Dunn. But for Scott's testimony, 
the State lacked any substantial evidence of Dunn's mens rea, 
whether it be the intent necessary to support a second degree 
murder conviction, or the mere recklessness required for man-
slaughter. 
As conceded by the State, the dispute at trial "was not as 
to the circumstances and causes of Mr. Sprinkle's death, but with 
what state of mind defendant had participated." State's Br. at 
33. Aside from the testimony of Howard Scott, the only "par-
ticipation" of Dunn established by the prosecution from which 
Dunn's mental state could be inferred by the jury was his driving 
driver kills innocent motorist); State v. Pitts, 84 Mich. App. 656, 
270 N.W.2d 482 (1978) (defendant liable where fellow participant 
in neighborhood fight negligently discharged firearm resulting in 
death of neighbor). Thus, accomplice liability may not be based 
upon a lesser mental state than that required to convict the 
principal. See, e.g., LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 6.7(e) at 
p. 585 (2d ed. 1986). 
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the motorhome• It was undisputed that it was Scott -- and only 
Scott -- who had actually bound, beaten and shot Mr. Sprinkle, 
The State argues that a conviction may not be overturned 
merely because the jury chose to disbelieve the defendant. Dunn, 
however, does not rely upon his own testimony to challenge his 
convictions. As discussed at Point VI B of Dunn's opening Brief 
and of this Reply Brief, it was the State's burden to disprove 
Dunn's defense of compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt. But the 
circumstantial evidence recited by the State in support of the 
convictions - i.e., the fact that Dunn drove the motorhome away 
from the gas station at a high rate of speed, the fact that 
bullets matching the murder weapon were found in Dunn's duffle 
bag,12 the fact that when initially stopped by Trooper Larsen, 
Dunn stated that the motorhome was a "drive-out" car from Cal-
ifornia13 - is entirely consistent with that defense. 
12The bullets were the subject of a suppression motion which 
should have been granted. See Point IV of Dunn's opening Brief and 
of this Reply Brief* Even if the bullets were properly received in 
evidence, however, the fact that they were found in Dunn's duffle 
bag does not disprove the existence of coercion. Other undisputed 
evidence showed that Scott had stacked the duffle bag along with 
several other bags against the bathroom door just before the 
motorhome was stopped by the police and that the bullets were found 
at the very top of the duffle bag. T. 263 and 277. There was also 
some evidence that the gun belonged to Scott. T. 375. 
13This statement was made immediately after the motorhome was 
stopped, before any backup officer had arrived, and while Dunn was 
still seated in the motorhome next to Scott and may reasonably have 
believed that Scott still had possession of the gun. T. 262. 
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This circumstantial evidence is so slight and insubstantial 
that a jury could not reasonably rely upon it to convict Dunn, 
To "bolster" this evidence, the State relies upon the testimony 
of Howard Scott. A transcript of Scott's trial testimony is 
attached to this Reply Brief as Addendum B. A reading of that 
transcript convincingly demonstrates that Scottfs testimony was 
inherently unreliable and could not be relied upon by reasonable 
minds to convict a person of a criminal offense. 
Even the prosecution placed no credence in Scott's testi-
mony. The prosecution's direct examination began with the fol-
lowing admission: 
Q. In the past you have not always stuck to 
the truth in explaining your story; have you? 
A. No. 
Tr. 491. 
Direct examination concluded on a similar note: 
Q. You didn't object to that [a purported 
plan to drive to Denver to kill Sprinkle's 
wife], did you? 
A. Yes I did. 
Q. 0, Howard, you did not. 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. You've told a lot of stories different 
than that one; haven't you? 
A. I've told thousands. 
Q. You what? 
A. Yes. 
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Tr. 496, 
Cross-examination followed in a similar vein. Scott ad-
mitted to several prior convictions, including at least one 
felony. When questioned about a statement he made only ten days 
earlier in accordance with his plea bargain, Scott testified: 
Q. Do you remember giving a statement to 
Mr. Brown in the presence of your own lawyer 
on December 20th right here in the Court-
house? 
A. About what? 
Q. About the facts of this case. 
A. I don't remember nothing. I have other 
things on my mind. Like No. 1, I've been 
worrying about my grandmother. 
Tr. 508. 
In response to further questioning concerning the statement, 
Scott testified: 
Q. Do you remember this question being 
asked you on December 20th: "You're the only 
one that even hit the Old Man; is that 
right," and your answer, "Yes, hell, hell." 




Q. What about this question: "How many 
times did you hit him?" And your answer: 
"Once." Do you recall that? 
A. No. 
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Q. Do you recall this question: "With the 
gun? Right?" And your answer: "Right." 
A. Nope. I'm just one of the good old 
boys. 
Tr. 508-509. 
After Scott continued to deny,portions of his statement, he 
was asked: 
Q. It's only been ten days ago, Mr. Scott. 
Don't you remember that? 
A, Like I just told you. I worry about my 
grandmother. I have problems of my own. So, 
whatever happened then is completely out of 
my mind. There's only one person I've got on 
my mind and that's my grandmother. 
Q. And you didn't promise to testify in 
this case? 
A. No. I didn't. I don't make promises. 
Tr. 509. 
* 
Redirect examination by the prosecutor began with the fol-
lowing exchange: 
Q. About the only time we can believe you 
is when there's something there in writing to 
back you up; isn't it? 
A. (No answer). 
Q. You've seen quite a few doctors who gave 
a diagnosis on you as a pathological liar; 
haven't you. 
A. Yes. 
Q* It's hard to argue with; isn't it. 
A. It sure don't. 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tr. 510. 
On recross, Scott continued to deny having made a statement 
in connection with his plea bargain. Tr. 514. Finally, the 
prosecutor was forced to take the stand to establish that the 
statement and the plea bargain had been made. T. 517-519. In so 
doing, the prosecutor revealed his personal opinion that Scott 
had violated the terms of the plea bargain by failing to testify 
truthfully: 
Q. You heard Mr. Scott deny the agreement 
having been reached with the prosecution; is 
that true? 
A. I heard it. 
Q. Is that true? 
A. No. That's incorrect but it may be true . 
now, however. 
T. 518. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated that "Howard 
Scott would tell a lie at any time to make him look good." T. 
556. 
Scott's prior felony convictions, his own guilt for the 
murder of Sprinkle, his promise to testify against Dunn in 
exchange for a guilty plea to a reduced charge, and his numerous 
inconsistent statements concerning Dunn's involvement render his 
testimony inherently unreliable to support a criminal conviction. 
His obvious contempt for the judicial process and the oath of 
truthfulness he had sworn, however, make any conviction based 
upon his testimony an outright mockery of justice. 
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Scott was so blatantly deceitful and contemptuous of the 
truth that even the most trustworthy corroborating evidence could 
not render his testimony reliable. . The State, however, offers 
only the testimony of Thomas Gleffe to corroborate Scott's story. 
Rather than corroborating Scott, Gleffe actually contradicted 
Scott's testimony in two important respects. First, contrary to 
Scott's claim that he obtained the gun from Dunn, T. 494, Gleffe 
testified as follows: 
Q. And did Scott say anything to you on that 
occasion about the gun? 
A. He just said that he always carried it; 
he always had it with him. That was his gun. 
Q. He told you that it was his gun? 
A. Yes. 
T. 374-75. 
Second, Gleffe contradicted Scott's testimony on the key 
issue of whether Dunn had intended to kill Sprinkle. Although 
Scott testified that he shot Sprinkle at Dunn's behest, T. 494-
95, Gleffe testified as follows: 
Q. Did he [Dunn] also discuss with you what 
they intended with Mr. Sprinkle? 
A. It was, at the time, just to tie him up 
and take his money and let it go at that. 
Q. Did he express a little surprise that it 
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In addition to contradicting Scott on material facts, 
Gleffefs testimony was scarcely more reliable than that of Scott. 
At the time he testified in Dunn's trial, Gleffe was serving time 
himself for a felony conviction. T. 373. Moreover, Gleffe had 
been incarcerated in the Sevier County Jail with Scott. Under 
the circumstances, Gleffefs claim that Dunn told him that Dunn 
and Scott had intended to tie Sprinkle up and rob him is insuf-
ficient to corroborate the testimony of Scott. 
Reasonable minds could not rely on the testimony of Scott 
and Gleffe to convict a person of any crime, let alone one for 
which he may be imprisoned for life. Aside from the testimony of 
Scott, the circumstantial evidence against Dunn is insufficient 
to support his convictions. The convictions should therefore be 
reversed. 
IV. BULLETS FOUND PURSUANT TO THE ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF 
THE DUFFLE BAG SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
A. Dunn Sufficiently Raised The Objection To The 
Search And Seizure Of The Duffle Bag. 
The State alleges that Mr. Dunn's attorney failed to raise 
the issue of the illegal search which lead to the discovery of 
bullets similar to those used in the murder. In fact, during the 
initial argument over the admission of testimony regarding the 
bullets, it was the prosecution, not Mr. Taylor who framed the 
argument when he suggested that the jury be excused: "We intend 
to introduce evidence, Your Honor, that the duffle bag belonged 
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to Robert Dunn. I believe this was the substance of one of Mr. 
Taylor's motions so I'll just ask the questions of Officer Page." 
T. 278. After the judge heard the.proposed testimony, Mr. Taylor 
argued to the court: 
The first question is whether or not the 
little discussion between Mr. Page and Mr. 
Dunn on the 14th is a voluntary statement or, 
if we have the Miranda come to play at that 
point in time, and I believe that the other 
question would be whether or not the dis-
covery of that stuff in the Sheriff's Office 
later is a plain view situation. I don't 
think it comes under the warrant and I recog-
nize that probable merit on the issues and 
I'm not going to belabor it at this point but 
I am going to object to the admissibility of 
the statements between Dunn and Mr. Page and 
the fruits obtained therefrom as being a 
statement that the Miranda should have been 
used to safeguard it, because it wasn't there 
and can't come in and the seizure of the 
duffle bag's contents, that show ownership of 
the bag, as being outside the scope of the 
warrant and, therefore suppressible. 
T. 285-86. (Emphasis added). The court's ruling further re-
flected the Fourth Amendment issues raised In the objection. The 
court ruled: "In the Court's opinion the duffle bag was appar-
ently picked up, in plain view, and brought back apparently to 
the jail and apparently the Defendant asked the officer to go 
through the bag and find him some medicine." T. 286. It is 
clear from these comments that defendant did challenge the scope 
of the search warrant and that the court understood and addressed 
that challenge when it ruled that the evidence was admissible. 
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( 
The State's claim that this objection was raised exclusively 
under the Fifth Amendment is incorrect. In defense counsel's 
argument to the court he never mentioned any specific amendment 
to the United States Constitution, He simply said that he was 
not going to argue for suppression based on "a defective warrant 
and affidavit." T. 285. Defense counsel stated that the conver-
sation between Mr. Dunn and Mr. Page should have been suppressed 
because of the lack of a Miranda warning and also argued that 
there was a problem with the duffle bag not falling within the 
scope of the warrant. In his argument over the Miranda warning, 
there was no mention of the Fifth Amendment. In his argument 
over the scope of the warrant there was no specific reference to 
the Fourth Amendment. The court's ruling indicates that it was 
clear that both issues were raised.14 
B. The Search Of The Duffle Bag Was Outside The Scope 
Of The Warrant. 
The State alleges that there is no support for Mr. Dunn's 
claim that the search of the duffle bag was outside the scope of 
the warrant. In fact, as Mr. Dunn argued in his opening brief, 
14In addition, in the Anders brief filed with this Court in Mr. 
Dunn's first appeal, defense counsel phrased the search and seizure 
issue in terms of suppression of evidence. Brief of Appellant 
filed January 20, 1982, p. 7. The issue was stated as, "Did the 
trial court err in not suppressing evidence of bullets removed from 
Defendant's personal belongings." Although this statement of the 
issue came after the trial, it sheds some light on defense 
counsel's objection during the trial and supports the conclusion 
that Mr. Dunn's objection to the search of the duffle bag was not 
waived. 
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the search and seizure of the duffle bag exceeded the State's 
authority under the warrant. A search warrant does not give 
police the authority to seize every object within the area being 
searched. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2307-08 (1990); 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-71 (1971). While 
the police in this case had a warrant to search the motorhome, 
they had no authority to seize every object within the motorhome 
whether it constituted evidence or not. The removal of the 
duffle bag from the motorhome and the subsequent search at the 
police station constituted a search and seizure outside the scope 
of the warrant. "In the course of a legal search, officers may 
make a warrantless seizure of objects inadvertently found in 
plain view, if it is 'immediately apparent to the police that 
they have evidence before them.'" United States v. Hillyard, 677 
F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1982) quoting Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, supra. Although the inadvertence requirement was reversed 
in Horton, supra, the plain view requirement was reaffirmed. 
Horton at 2310. In this case, the search warrant directed the 
police to search the motorhome for evidence related to the crime. 
T. 285. When the police seized the duffle bag and brought it to 
the police station, it was not immediately apparent that it would 
provide evidence in the case. The separate seizure of the duffle 
bag when its evidentiary value was not in plain view was not 
pursuant to the warrant. Thus, the trial court's conclusion that 
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the duffle bag was in plain view is meaningless because the 
unopened duffle bag did not manifest any evidentiary value. T. 
286. The police had to open the closed duffle bag and two addi-
tional closed containers in order to discover the bullets. Thus, 
the search at the police station was not within the scope of the 
warrant and the evidence flowing from that search should have 
been suppressed. 
The State also claims that Mr. Dunn consented to the search 
when he told one of the officers that he needed prescription 
medicines out of the duffle bag. In fact the officer's actual 
testimony was that Mr. Dunn said, "Bring the duffle bag over, you 
know, and we can get the medicine out of there." T. 280. This 
was not an affirmative consent or even acquiescence to the 
search, rather it was a limited request by Mr. Dunn to get his 
medication out of the duffle bag. 
The search of the duffle bag was not pursuant to the warrant 
nor was it pursuant to Mr. Dunn's request for his medicine. As 
demonstrated in Mr. Dunn's opening brief, the search did not fall 
within any of the other exceptions to the warrant requirements of 
the United States and Utah Constitutions. As a result, the 
bullets discovered during that search should have been sup-
pressed. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE VICTIM TAKEN AT THE MURDER 
SCENE. 
The State argues that the trial court did not err in 
admitting a bloody photograph of Sprinkle's corpse because the 
photo was not sufficiently gruesome. The State is wrong; it was 
gruesome. However, the reason the photograph should not have 
been admitted was because it had no probative value. A weighing 
of gruesomeness against probative value should occur only after a
 f 
determination has been made that a photograph has "essential 
evidentiary" value. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Utah 
1986). The State alleges that the photograph was probative of 
the type of homicide which occurred but does not explain how the 
photograph was relevant to this issue. Moreover, the type of 
homicide was never at issue. The connection between the photo-
graph and the type of homicide committed by Mr. Dunn is par-
ticularly unclear in light of the fact that Mr. Dunn's purported 
role in the murder was as an accomplice. The photograph does 
nothing to shed light on Mr. Dunn's state of mind at the time of 
the killing or the extent of his involvement. The photograph was 
not relevant and therefore should not have been admitted. 
Even if the photograph did have evidentiary value, it was 
sufficiently gruesome to warrant exclusion. In State v. Jensen, 
727 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah 1986) this Court described the duty of 
the trial court in admitting prejudicial photographs: 
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That discretion is especially germane when-
ever the prosecution proposes to admit grue-
some color photographs of the body of a hom-
icide victim. In all such cases, the court 
should determine whether the viewing of the 
photographs by the jury would create a sub-
stantial danger of undue prejudice against 
the defendant, and if so, whether that danger 
substantially outweighs the photographs' 
essential evidentiary value. The more 
inflammatory the photograph, the greater the 
need to establish its essential evidentiary 
value . . . . 
After quoting Jensen, this Court in State v. Valdez, 748 
P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987), stated that as with any inquiry under Utah 
R. Evid. 403, "the court must undertake a balancing test, weigh-
ing the photographsf essential evidentiary value against any 
potential for unfair jury prejudice." Even under the cases cited 
by the State, Valdez and State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989) 
the test is still requires a weighing of jury prejudice against 
probative value. After reviewing the photographs in both Cobb 
and Valdez, the Court found them not to be gruesome. In Cobb for 
instance, the Court notes "The photograph shows the victim's 
partially uncovered body lying supinely on what appears to be a 
clean surface. Only the area between the thigh and chest (where 
the two wounds were inflicted) is exposed. The victim's head and 
face are not shown." Id. at 1125. Similarly, in Valdez, the 
Court noted that the pictures were "not particularly bloody or 
gruesome and were shown a large piece of cardboard in an array 
that included nonobjectionable photos, thereby greatly minimizing 
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the challenged photos1 visual impact." Id. at 1055. 
The photograph in this case was both bloody and gruesome. 
The photograph showed the victim's twisted blood smeared body and 
blood soaked shirt next to the blood smeared toilet of the motor-
home. This photograph was significantly more gruesome than the 
photographs found admissible in Cobb and Valdez. More impor-
tantly, the photograph was not necessary to any issue the State 
needed to prove at trial. The State contends that the prose-
cution needed the photograph to educate the jury on the appro-
priate degree of murder. In fact, the photograph of the bloody 
corpse did nothing to distinguish the degrees of murder from each 
other. The photograph proved nothing about Dunn's level of 
participation or of his mental state at the time of the murder. 
The gruesome photograph had no probative value and should not 
have been admitted as evidence. 
VI. MR. DUNN WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT 
TRIAL. 
A. Scott's Testimony Was Uncorroborated And Dunn's 
Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Request A 
Cautionary Instruction To The Jury. 
In response to Dunn's contention that the failure of his 
trial counsel to request an uncorroborated accomplice testimony 
instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
State argues that Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1980) leaves the 
issue of whether to give such an instruction to the discretion of 
the trial court unless it finds that the testimony is "self-con-
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tradictory, uncertain or improbable." As previously discussed, 
Scott's testimony certainly fits that description. See pp. 23-
27, supra. Aside from the numerous prior inconsistent statements 
Scott had made concerning Dunn's involvement in the crime, Scott 
equivocated so flagrantly concerning the statement he made when 
he entered his guilty plea that the prosecutor was required to 
take the stand to impeach his own witness. T. 517-19. The 
prosecutor acknowledged Scott's lack of credibility when he 
intimated that Scott had violated the terms of the plea bargain 
by failing to testify truthfully. T. 518. An instruction to the 
jury to view Scott's testimony with caution was clearly mandated 
by section 77-17-7. 
The State further argues that section 77-17-7 does not apply 
because Scott's testimony was corroborated by other, circum-
stantial evidence and by the testimony of Thomas Gleffe. This 
argument has no merit. In State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 
1980), this Court discussed the standard for the corroboration of 
accomplice testimony: 
This Court has previously stated that the 
corroboration need not go to all the material 
facts as testified to by the accomplice, nor 
need it be sufficient in itself to support a 
conviction. However, the corroborating evi-
dence must connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense and be consistent 
with his guilt and inconsistent with his 
innocence. 
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Id. at 1167 (citations omitted). Based on this standard, the 
evidence was insufficient to corroborate Scott's testimony. The 
evidence neither connects Dunn with the commission of the crime, 
nor is it inconsistent with his innocence. 
The State contends that except for Dunn's involvement in the 
crime, "all other aspects of Scott's testimony were not even 
disputed." State's Br. at 46. Aside from being incorrect, this 
statement is meaningless. None of the other aspects of Scott's 
testimony either connected Dunn with the commission of the kid-
napping and homicide, nor were they inconsistent with Dunn's 
innocence. Since the other aspects of Scott's testimony were not 
even material, the only reason to dispute them would be again to 
challenge Scott's credibility. In fact, however, defense counsel 
did challenge the collateral aspects of Scott's testimony where, 
for example, he disputed Scott's testimony that he hadn't driven 
the motorhome. T. 500-01. While Scott was not insane enough to 
deny that he even shot Sprinkle — a fact that was not only 
undisputed but, under the circumstances, indisputable -- that is 
certainly not evidence that he was telling the truth when it was 
only his word against that of Dunn. 
The State next claims, without citation to the record, that 
"witnesses at the time of the crime viewed defendant and Scott as 
acting in concert." State's Br. at 46. This claim is unsup-
ported by the record. The only witnesses who testified about 
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events "at the time of the crime" were Michael Stolz, the hitch-
hiker who saw Sprinkle in the back of the motorhome, and George 
Morrison, the attendant at the gas station in Richfield. Neither 
Stolz nor Morrison gave any testimony characterizing Dunn's 
actions or demeanor. T. 250-58; 355-62. Trooper Larsen was the 
only witness who ventured any opinion about Dunn's demeanor. He 
stated only that Dunn appeared "calm and collected" when Larsen 
asked him for identification after stopping the motorhome. T. 
263-64. This conclusory statement has little, if any, probative 
value as to Dunn's actual state of mind. Indeed, when Larsen 
made his observation, Dunn easily could have believed, perhaps 
correctly, that Scott still had possession or control of the 
gun.15 Once outside the motorhome, after several backup officers 
had arrived, Dunn made the exculpatory statement, "All I was told 
was to drive." T. 269-270. Thus, none of the witnesses to 
events at the time of the crime corroborate Scott's testimony. 
The State also cites the bullets found at the top of/Dunn's 
duffle bag as corroborating evidence. As previously discussed, 
the bullets should have been suppressed. See Point IV of Dunn's 
opening Brief and of this Reply Brief. In any event, Scott 
easily could have hidden them in the duffle bag when he piled the 
15Larsen also testified that Scott, who had shot Sprinkle only 
moments before, was still in the back of the motorhome when it was 
first stopped. T. 268. The murder weapon was later found under 
the mattress in the sleeping compartment above the cab of the 
motorhome on the passenger's side where Scott was sitting. T. 274. 
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bags up against the bathroom door of the motorhome before it was 
stopped by the police. T.263, 268. This explanation appears all 
the more likely in light of Thomas Gleffe's testimony that Scott 
told him that the gun belonged to Scott. T. 375. Thus, the 
bullets also fail to corroborate Scott's story. 
The State further relies upon the testimony of Thomas Gleffe 
to corroborate Scott. As previously discussed, rather than 
corroborating Scott, Gleffe actually contradicted Scott's 
testimony on two important points, including Dunn's intent. See 
pp. 27-28, supra. In addition to being inconsistent with Scott, 
Gleffe, a convicted felon and former fellow jail inmate of Scott, 
was hardly more reliable. To rely upon Gleffe's testimony to 
corroborate Scott would be to build a house of cards too pre-
carious to justify a criminal conviction. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any evidence sufficient 
to instill a rational belief in the testimony of one who, in the 
words of the prosecutor, was a pathological liar who "would tell 
a lie at any time to make him look good." T. 556. The above 
evidence falls far short of being sufficient to corroborate the 
testimony of Scott. Defense counsel was ineffective in failing 
to request an instruction to the jury to view Scott's testimony 
with caution. 
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B. Trial Counsel's Failure To Request An Appropriate 
Instruction On The Defense Of Compulsion Consti-
tuted Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel. 
The State argues that there was no need for a jury instruc-
tion explaining the burden of proof as it related to the affirma-
tive defense of compulsion. Although there is no Utah case ad-
dressing the burden of proof issue in the case of compulsion, 
this Court has addressed the issue of burden of proof instruc-
tions in the case of another affirmative defense. According to 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428-29 (Utah 1986), it was 
improper for a court to give an instruction on the affirmative 
defense of withdrawal without making it clear that the burden of 
proof is on the State to show that withdrawal has not occurred. 
Despite the State's claim to the contrary, Hansen mandates a 
clear statement concerning the burden of proof. 
Relying on State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), the 
State claims that a burden of proof instruction would have been 
unnecessarily repetitive. In fact, the State ignores a sig-
nificant distinction between the facts of Johnson and those of 
this case. In Johnson, the error alleged by the defendant was 
that "instruction No. 11 explained the concept of reasonable 
doubt in the positive as well as the negative and because 
instruction No. 12 explained the concept only in the positive, 
there was then a 'two-to-one imbalance' prejudicial to defen-
dant." Id. at 1146. The Court in Johnson was specifically con-
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cerned with jury instructions that are one for one repetitive. 
Although the Court noted that jury instructions must be read as a 
whole, it did not address the specific situation in this case: 
the need for a clear instruction on the burden of proof as it 
relates to an affirmative defense. 
In this case, the prejudice from the lack of a burden of 
proof instruction was exacerbated by the prosecutor in his 
closing argument: 
Robert Dunn raises one question and you're 
going to have to determine whether it leaves 
in your mind a reasonable doubt. Robert Dunn 
said that he was coerced and the Court has 
also given you an instruction on coercion and 
that Instruction says, "If he was engaged in 
conduct because of the use or threat of im-
minent use of unlawful force against him." 
What does the evidence show? The only evi-
dence of coercion whatsoever is Robert Dunn, 
his statement that he was afraid, that he was 
scared. What's the best threat he's come up 
with? The best threat he's come up with is 
Howard Scott saying, "Keep driving so no one 
gets hurt." Is that the threatened imminent 
use? There's a good reason for having a 
defense of coercion and there are many cases 
where people do have in a compulsion that 
they couldn't overcome. Ladies and gentle-
men, this is not the case. This isn't the 
case and we have no better witness that this 
isn't the case than Robert Dunn himself. 
T.552-53. The implication of the prosecutor's comments, and the 
instructions to which they are tied, is that it was Mr. Dunn's 
burden to prove that he was compelled and that he failed to meet 
that burden. 
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It is particularly important that the court give a clear 
explanation as to the burden of proof in the case of an affirma-
tive defense since the jury may otherwise assume the burden is on 
the defendant. Hansen at 429; see Lee v. State, 655 P.2d 1046, 
1047 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) ("we [hold] that where the defense 
of entrapment is fairly raised by the evidence, the burden of 
proof is upon the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused was not entrapped and the jury must be so in-
structed. " ) 
Despite the State's claim to the contrary, it is likely that 
a properly instructed jury would have found that the prosecution 
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dunn was not 
compelled. Erroneous jury instructions on the burden of proof as 
to affirmative defenses constitute plain error. State v. Carson, 
617 P.2d 573 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980). As a result, failure of 
defense counsel to request a compulsion instruction that clearly 
explained the burden of proof constitutes reversible error and 
was ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial resulting in Mr. Dunn's conviction was replete 
with error and, thus, the conviction should be reversed. The 
improper second degree murder instruction undermines the verdict 
and leaves in doubt the jury's conclusions about the evidence. 
Each of the other errors, the prosecutor's improper comments 
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during his closing argument, the improper admission of Mr. Dunnfs 
previous conviction, the trial court's failure to suppress the 
bullets, the improper admission of a photograph with no evi-
dentiary value and the trial counsel's failure to request jury 
instructions on accomplice liability and compulsion prejudiced 
the entire proceeding. Because Mr. Dunn was convicted on the 
basis of circumstantial evidence, the errors individually and 
cumulatively improperly bolstered the State's case. The result 
is that Mr. Dunn did not have a fair trial. If the court finds 
that there was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Dunn, the 
mandated result is reversal. At the very least, Mr. Dunn is 
entitled to a new trial. 
DATED this /2~ '' day of April, 1991. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
, ^ y , S C 
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II In his mind that it roes t* the in tan t. I atraM tfett't 
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41 THE COURTt Going *• tha Intent e l e a m t . 
SI MR. BROWN: I think It1 a probsbly coorobora-
6| tlve of vhat Howard Scott is going to say about Mr. Dunn's 
71 feelings toward the better off class of persons and why 
B| they shouldn't take action against them to get their due. 
J THE COURT: Your position is basically it's 
)0| not relevant and might be prejudicial in some way? 
Ilj MR. TAYLOR: It's prejudicial and inflanmator4 
12| It talks about dope and hope. I think that would inflame 
the jury. We don't have any issue of dope in this case 
but I still feel it's immaterial. I do say that. 
THE COURT: I'm going to reserve ruling on 
it and I'll have to see what develops when we get to that 
point, but at this point I won't rule on it. 
MR. TAYLOR: Alright. 
THE COURT: So, I'm not making a ruling on 
it, but I'll see the posture as of the time of the case 
when it's introduced. So, I'm reserving the ruling on the 
motion at this point, and that's No. 6. 
MR. TAYLOR: Now, the last motion, Your 














2S| evidence of prior convictions. 
26| THE COURT: Well, vhat about it? Do you 
have any objection to this? 
281 MR. BROWH: Well, I think he intends that I 
241 not be allowed to ash Mr. Dunn, when he's on the stand, if 






























I thlnV. it's obviously le*itinate grounds for lr?*ae'c*nt. 
THE COURTt Uhat about the rules? 
MR. BROW: If the Court will indulg* M t 
Ifd like to go through the rules and case lav on it. Tour 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Of course, 1 checked a little 
bit on this. Vn looking at Rule 55 which says, "Evidence 
that a person committed a crine on a specific occasion is 
inadmissible to the disposition to conoit crine as a basis 
for inference that he committed another crime on another 
specified occasion but such evidence is admissible when 
relevant to prove some other material fact including the 
absence of mistake or actual motive offered, intent, pre-
paration, plan, knowledge, or amenities.M 
By this rule it would seem to me at this 
point that it9a not admissible. So, I come back to you. 
What is the basis that you claim that it's admissible? 
MR. BROWN: Well, the basis I would claim 
admissibility is when Mr. Dunn takes the stand and pro-
fesses to be 111) white, I should be allowed to introduce 
that as part of his character for truth and veracity. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
MR. TAYLOR: Oh, Your Honor, I agree if the 
defense presents evidence of Mr. Dunn's good character, 
then the State has the right to icpeach that by adrissible 
evidence. Wefre not saying that. 
MR. BROUW: The mere fact that he takes the 
stand as a witness allows me to use that prior conviction. 
MR. TAYLOR: Oh, no! 
THE COURT: But the rule says otherwise; 
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doesn't It? 1 alci> cUecV.id quite a bit of t;tc case lav on 
it and, of course, those are Unite*} states cases which 
states, as a ncncral rule, that upon the trial of an accueep 
person evidence of another offense, wholly independent of 
the one being charged, is inadmissible, tlov, there are 
some exceptions that get into rebuttal but, as I see it --
131. LROir.1: Well. 1 don't intend to bring 
this in ny case in chief, Your Honor• 1 desire to do so 
on cross-exanination. 1 will a si; for a recess and go 
through the case law prior to doing so. 
THE COURT: Does that satisfy you, Mr. 
Taylor? 
MR. TAYLOR: W e l l — k, 
THE COURT: I kind of hate to -- if he juit 
brings it in and wants to put on the evidence, boom — of 
this prior conviction. I'm not going to allow it because I 
don't think it's admissible and I think our rules say that 
it is not admissible, but in the d.tentative. if your client! 
gets on the stand and you paint him as a character without 
blemish, you see what I mean, and it gets into that, then 
I think the prosecution has a right to go into it and I 
think he has the right. But what I'm really saying is that 
I can't really rule on that until I get to the posture--of 
the case vhere it cones out, but if he's attenptinj* to use 
it as evidence of the coumission of this crime, I'm not 
going to allow. 
Uow, do you follow what Ifm saying? 
MR. TAYLOR: I think I do, Your Honor, and I 
do agree with the Court that that conviction can come in 
through cross-examination or rebuttal as to defeat, or^ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i:Tccch or rebut in character, as evidence, if t!>e Ikfcn-
ilar.t presents it. 
THE COURT: That's right. So, 1 donft see 
where we've got a problem. An I wrong? 
MR. TAYLOR: But other than that, I think th^ 
should rule 
Court/that it is inadmissible. 
THE COURT: That's what I think 1 said; 
isn't it? 
131. BROT.^ 1: I think I'm going to have to 
justify its admissibility whenever it occurs, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, this is the ruling, 
gentlemen: That I'm not going to allow evidence of other 
crimes in your case in chief. Now, that's the ruling of 
it. As to what happens after your case in chief, I'D not 
going to pre-rule on that because I don't know what's 
going to happen and that's the basis of the ruling and 
that is, as 1 understand it, the basis of the law. 
MR. BROWN: Alright. We'll accept that. 
Your Honor. How, we'll go one step further: 
THE COURT: I think the danger of the rule 
is either that the jury might end up convicting him, not 
on the basis of the crime involved, but on some prior 
crime and I don't want to get into that situation. 
MR. TAYLOR: I'd ask one thing further, Your 
Honor: If, during the defense, Mr. Brown decides to 
attempt to get it In under the character matter, I would 
ask him to pause before he does so and exclude the jury and 
examine out of the presence of the jury before it comes 
out as I don't want it being blurted out. 
THE COURT: ^Alright, It's the order that, 
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when y*»u pc: to the ^ nint L:, crc; t-w..-^ .i'..Ml^ ;«, t;»Vw you 
feci that become* of inportancc to you, you vill notify 
the Court and ve vill get into it outside the presence of 
the Jury and I'll examine any law you have to sustain your 
respective positions. 
You1 re certainly welcome to see the lav that 
I have on this so that you can see the basis of my ruling. 
131. TAYLOR: Ok eh. Your Honor, the only 
other matter --
TI1E COURT: Let me just say that there are 
situations where it is allowed. I've given ny ruling and 
I've based it on the general rule and I understand under 
all the courts which are based on the Utah Rules of 
Eivdence of which I indicated but I just wanted you to know 
that. : ^ J 
MR. TAYLOR: The only other motion, Your 
Honor, and I believe I mentioned that yesterday that I'd 
like to do it during the course of trial and that is to 
suppress and the motion that I have vill be a brief one and 
vhen the point of the trial comes that the prosecution will 
attempt to introduce that, I'll notify the Court and ve can 
do that during the trial.. I think that vill save time. 
THE COURT: Do you vant to give me some •• 
or tell me vhat it's about9 so I have an idea of what I am 
being faced with? Because I don't know vhat we're talking 
about. 
MR. TAYLOR: I think the State will attempt 
evidence the Mil 
to introduce into/ownership of a certain person's belorifclngf 
of Mr. Dunn, some bap^age, a duffle ba£, contents of the 
duffle bap, and ve vill object to that. . JL 
T~fcS&\2£-. 
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"Look for the papers or the transport papers to the 
vehicle," and I still pretended to lo<uU for them and, if 
I was telling the truth, he might kill somebody and Jump 
out and so I didn't know whether to go on with what he 
said until I could get a better chance or not, so I did 
look around in the console area there, still looking for 
some papers and I didn't know what to say or what to do 
and I just told the officer, "I can't seem to find them," 
a:.d r.u siiJ, "leek ana in," and that's vhcn I settled d?vn 
again and I did and I kind of looked up and I didn't see 
the gun at that point. So I — 
Q You looked up to see what Scott was doing? 
A I was looking down for the papers and I 
glanced up, over the top of my glasses, to see what 
Scott might be doing and he was just sitting there and I 
didn't see the gun so I knew I was not In no danger of 
getting shot. So the officer, at that time, asked me to 
step out and, when I stepped out, I was a little more 
relieved after I stepped out because somebody was there 
like a security blanket. He was there, he had a gun, and 
he could protect me if anything did happen. 
MR. TAYLOR: You may cross. 
MR. BROWN: Before we start, Vd like to 
have a hearing outside the_presence of^the jury for two 
or three seconds. 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury, will you please go to the commissioners room andr 
once again, it's jrour-duty not to converse a&ong your-
selves about the matter. ~£^y 
Thank you. ' "-——. 16s£ _; | Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1
 (\7hcreiipiDi^ -fehe—Jtnry l e f t the Courtroont after 
-I which tijgntne^tuunwinc prnrf»pfUnss were had:) 
3 THEJCQURT:" Let the record show that the 
4j Jury I s out of^thff rouTrxoum aL th i s time. 
5 M^iROWT:" Your Honor, I Intend to open my 
6| croa*-examijiatJLoi^bxTiue9tloH& to prior 
1\ f e l o n i e s . 
81 THE COURT: What's the r u l e . Counsel? 
*j M?*. EROT!;-. I b e l i e v e ur.der Che Bennett case 
101 any witness can be required, to answer asto-whether or 
111 not he has such a conviction and, i f so , what the convic-
121 t ion i s for* 
131 THE COURT: What about i t . Counsel? 
HI , MR. TAYLOR:- - Weil, the Court ruled at the 
151 beginning of the t r i a l that i t can come in i f i t f s In 
161 rebuttal of character evidence. We haven't presented any 
171 character evidence. 
181 THE COURT: What about i t , Cotsieelt 
19| MR. BROWN: He doesn't need to present i t . 
201 Any t ine he takes the stand he can be questioned to answer 
2l| regarding his prior convictions and that ' s according to 
221 the case s tatutes . 
231 THE COURT: Are y o u r e l y i n g on ~ w h a t ' s 
041 the statutes? 
25I MR* BROUtl: I'm rely ing on State v s . 
o6 | Bennett and I have i t r ight here, Your Honor. § 
THE COURT: I assume you9re relying on 
2BI Rule 21 under the Rules of Evidence? 
MR. BROWtl: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have anything? I ha 
29 
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examined 78-24-5 where Itfsays That the witness must 
answer 78-24-9, where he has previdus^onvictions of a 
felony. I've examined Rule 21 of the Rules of Evidence. 
I've jxamiaa* State vs. Bennett, 517 P2d 1029. 
MR. TAYLOR? If the Court is inclined to 
admit it, I'd like to submit some authorities. 
THE COURT: I'm inclined to admit it at this 
point, but I'll hear you. 
::?.. TAYLOR: I :.^ v. citations. Your -o-or, 
from eight cases, all jurisdictions that are reported in 
the Pacific Reporter'System. I have underlined portions 
that I thought was applicable to this situation. 
THE COURT: You've underlined certain por-
tions? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. I have. 
THE COURT: Do you know if Counsel has a 
statute under this? 
MR. TAYLOR: I didn't read the California 
statutes. Your Honor, other than what it says in the case 
law. 
THE COURT: Ifd like to hear what the testi-
mony is. I'd like to hear you on that. I'd like to know 
what your questions are. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MIC BROWN: 
Q The first question will be whether you have a 
in I in hjjiiiy i Hlnili I Inn Mr. Dunn? 
A Yes. 
Q And what's that conviction for? 
* A«aatt1f 
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Q Assault with a deadly weapon? 
A Yes. 
Q Did that involve the abduction of a girl --
MR. TAYLOR: Objection, Your Honor, It's 
clear even though Utah hasn't addressed the main points 
**-
that we have to decide here, it's clear in every juris-
diction in the country that the date, the fact of a convic-
tion, the date thereof, and the name of the crime is the 
linit co the evidence en crciibility. 
TilE COURT: Give me your authority, gentle-
men, give me your authorities. 
MR, TAYLOR: I'll refer to an article by 
Ronald N. Boyce, probably the chief authority on evidence 
in the State of Utah, therein he discusses both the 
Bennett case, Rule 21, Rule 55, the other rules and other 
case law and that's his conclusion* 
TIIE COURT: Give me your article, Counsel* 
(Whereupon the Court read the article after 
which time the following proceedings were had:) 
THE COURT: I don't see what you're relying 
on, Mr. Taylor. What in this article are you relying on? 
Is it what you've underlined? Point it out, please. 
MR. TAYLOR: Right here. 
TIIE COURT: It doesa-'t say that; does it? 
Your objection's overruled at this point. Ask your next 
question. Counsel. Your objection's overruled at this 
point. 
Q And that conviction was for assault with a 
deadly weapon which involved the abduction of a girl? 
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0 Is .that correct? 
-~~-k~ Yes. 
MR. BROWT: That's the only intentions I 
Intend to use. Your Honor. 
THE-COURT: .. Alright. Dojou have anything 
core youfd like to say? .. —-~- *-"•— 
MR.^AYLOR: Well, the Court has toy authori-
ties. -
allow the questlotw-**rtnc the Jury back In. 
(Whereupon the Jury returned to the Courtroom, 
after vhlch tine the following proceedings were had:) 
Q Mr. Dunn, is it true that you have ~ 
THE COURT: Walt a minute. 
KR. BROWN: I*g_.aarry. 
THE COURT: For the purpose of the record, 
the record should JLndlcate that the Jury's In the box, they] 
have returned, and you may proceed. 
Q Is it true that you have a felony conviction, 
a prior felony cgai*crfon? 
A Yes. 
Q What Is that conviction? 
A Assault with a deadly weapon. 
Q Did that assault with a deadly weapon pertain 
to abduction of a girl in California? 
A Yes, it did. 
Q When did that take place? 
MR. TAYLOR: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Your objection9s overruled. 
A 1973. 
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ww « « i«— bJ th* " ' " °£ 
tor.tatt.1. h .v lo 6 b « ~ £ i r " 
d u l y w o t . to t . l l t h . truth, t h . 
„hol. truth, mi - t h i n s but t h . truth 
• took t h . — — « - t " t l U e < l 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BROWN: 
Q Scate your n : ^ . 
X Howard S c o t t . 
, «h«r. -r. Tou lo=at.d-. * . Scott, 
A Sevier County Jail-
Q 
Have you been there since August 14th? 
A Yes. 
Q You realize you're under oath this afternoon; 
don't you, Mr. Scott? 
A Yes. 
Q You realise you're going to tell the truth; 
don't you? 
A Yes. 
Q In the past you have not always stuck to the 
truth in explaining your story; have you? 
A No. 
Q But today, you're going to tell the truth? 
A Yes. 
Q When you left from Nevada heading for Utah, 
who was driving the vehicle after you stopped at Mesqultej 
was Mr. Dunn driving? 
A Cone back on that one again, please. 
Q After you left that casino in Mesquite and 
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headed £$•£ U'<*.••> -, *-r Dunn was driving the vehicle? 
Q £ ivv, ">>r inkle decided to go back and lie 
down &nJ r;c t sl:.e£; didn't he? 
A Ysx, he did. 
Q The*-, at corns point along the road, you went 
back and hit him in the head; didn't you? 
A Yes. 
Q W.;y did you do that? 
A Dunn told me to. 
Q What did he say? 
A Ue said the old man had to be killed. 
Q Why? 
A Because he was getting on his nerves and 
aggravating and trying to tell him how to drive. 
Q What did he say about how he was driving? 
A That he hadn't been driving the right way or 
something like that. 
Q Mr. Sprinkle also said something that made you' 
mad; didn't he? 
A He called me a few names. 
Said you ought to go back to Africa? 
A Yes, 





Did you and Mr. Dunn have a discussion about 
Q 
Mr. Sprinkle's money? 
A Yes. 
What was that discussion about? I Q 
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A 







He said he wanted to take the old can ' s money.1 
•*fWrwanted to take I t too; d idn ' t you? 
Not r ea l ly . 1 
You weren't going to turn i t down; were you? 1 
No. 
Who t i ed Mr. Sprinkle up? 
He and Dunn. 1 















Where did that take place? 
Right there at the truck stop on 1-15, coming 
So you stopped there at the truck stop or Mr. 
Yes. 
And the two of you put Mr. Sprinkle in the 
Yes. 
Did you have anything around his mouth? 
Had a towel. 
Who put the towel around his mouth? 
Dunn put that around it. 
And subsequently nothing else happened until 
you got to the AMOCO Service Station at Richfield. Utah; 
is that right? 
A That's true. 
Q What happened at the AMOCO Service Station 
or as you were leaving the service station? 
A Well, when we reached the service station, the 
inside of the service station. I was inside. 
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Q Okeh. 
At^gggan w/>«* outride calling the hitch hiker. 
I come out. Dunn ran back inside to the old man who was 
coming out of the bathroom and shoved the old man back in 
and I got back in the motor home and took off and. Dunn 
•aid. "Well, the Old Han's got to be killed," and if you 
don't, then he was going to do it. 







Where did you get the gun? 
From Dunn. 
When did you get the gun from Dunn? 
A Well, he gave me that when the Old Man was 
laying down. 
Q Did you see where Mr. Punn got the gun from 
before he gave it to you? 
A Out of his back pack. 
Q What does his back pack look like? 
A Well, it was a duffle bag. I wouldn't call it 
a back pack. It was a duffle bag. 
Q Did you see him get it out of his duffle bag? 
A Yes. 
Q Why did he give it to you? 
A I don't know. I was kind of curious about 
that. 
Q When you left the service station, you shot 
Mr. Sprinkle? 
A I'm the one who shot him. 
Q Why did you shoot him? 
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M A Because Dunn said the Old lian had to be 
2
 killed. ' ",|aBI" '"" 
3| Q You xauat not have disagreed with that state 
*l meat; did you? 
5I A Yeah, in a way I did. 
6| # Q You atill shot him; didn't you? 
M A Well, Dunn said we had to. 
*l Q What did you do with the gun? 
""i A Tne gun was s-iLL ^uerr.eatn t?.a ^.i::rsss. 
Q Well, you put it up there; didn't you? 
A I guess so. 
Q At any time in this whole thing, did you 
threaten Mr. Dunn? 
A No. I didn't. 
Q Did you order him to drive? 
A I ordered him to do nothing. 
Q What were you planning to do with Mr. 
Sprinkle's body and the vehicle? 
A Well, he said, after that he said, he wanted 
to go to Denver to get the Old Man's old lady. 
Q So. you thought she lived in Denver; didn't 
you? Both of you did. both you and Dunn? 
A Well. when I looked at the picture, it was 
in California. She was in California. 
Q But you were both under the impression she 
lived in Denver; didn't you? 
A Yes. 
281 Q What were you going to do when you got to 
29| Denver? 
J0. A Well, he said, he said that after we got to 
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Denver, he was going to the o ld l a d y ' s house, knock on thcj 
door, t€TS29*r the Old Man was back i n s i d e the note;: 
3l home i n the bathroom and that he was s i c k and needed some 
4l h e l p . 
51 Q Then what? 
61 A So, a f t e r she got i n there , I guess vtu would 
7| do t h a t , he was going t o k i l l her and take the motor 
home down to M i s s i s s i p p i , Louis iana, and dump that motor 
j> r.c~e ar^A ever/.r.lr.g in s c i e (^uick sar.i down there . 
101 Q You d i d n ' t o b j e c t t o t h a t ; did you? 
Ill A Yes. I d id . 
121 Q Oh, Howard, you did n o t . 
131 A Oh, y e s . 
141 Q You've t o l d a l o t of s t o r i e s d i f f e r e n t than 
]5J t h a t one; haven' t you? 
\(A A I ' v e t o l d thousands. • 
17| Q You what? 
18 A Yes. 
]9| Q Are you t e l l i n g the t ru th today? 
A Yes. 
2i| MR. BROWN: I have no further questions* 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
3| BY MR. TAYLOR: 
nA Q How many times have you lied about this, Mr. 
Scott? 
A I don't count them. 
Q Many times; haven't you? 
~. A I guess so. I don't count them. 
. Q Right after you were arrested on the 14th of 
August, you were taken down to the Sal in a City Hall and 
MM 
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interviewed by some police officers; weren't you? 
A l ^l!*|ues8 so. 
Q Well, don't you know? 
(No answer). 
Do you know, Mr. Scott? 
If you say so. 
What do you say? 
I guess I was. I don't know. 
W u vloa'u j«"ow if you ware ca'r.en to the Salir.a 
City Hall and interviewed? 
A I guess. 
Q And everything that you told the officers at 
that time was a lie; wasn't it? 
A It all depends on how you see it. 
Q You did tell them a lot of lies though; didn'tl 
you? You told them on that day in Salina that you didn't! 
shoot Mr. Sprinkle; didn't you? I 
A (No answer). 
Q Answer out loud, Mr. Scott. 
A I don't know if I did or not. 
Q And you told them that you didn't tie Mr. 
Sprinkle up; didn't you? 
A I don't remember. 
Q And you told them that you didn't hit Mr. 
Sprinkle; didn't you? 
A Still don't know. 
Q And as recently as December 20th of this year,! 
you changed your story and said you did tie him up; 
didn't you? 
A I don't remember. 
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Q You told Jerry Ilice of the Sheriff 








1 still don't remember. 
You are testifying here 







because you I 
' 
Q You don't? 
A 1 didn't promise nobody. 




Q Do you recall having been tried a couple of 
weeks ago? 
A Yes. 1 was tried. 
Q And do you recall the jury getting hung on the 
murder count? 
A So what? That's the Jury. 
Q And you recall making a deal with the prose-
cution after that; don't you? 
A I didn't make nothing. 
Q Well, you didn't? 
A 1 didn't make it. 
Q Didn't you promise to testify for the State 
if they would reduce the charge to Second Degree Murder? 
A Ho. 
Q Oh, you didn't promise that? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 



















\ \ A No. 
J Q - ^ . W t y o u promised to plead "Guilty" to a 
reduced charge and testify for the State if they would 
reduce it; didn't you? 
A Ho. 
Q What did you promise them? 
A i ain't promised them nothing. 












I can't answer that question. 
Do you recall giving a statement to the Sevier! 
County Sheriff, to the law enforcement officers on 1980. 
when this question was asked of you? "What did he do 
when you were p,oing through the mountains that antagonized! 
you so you hit him/' and do you recall your answer? 
"So he kept on aggravating, aggravating, 
aggravating. I told him, I said, 'Mr., look. I 
appreciate what you're doing for me and everything 
but don't keep aggravating.'" 
Do you recall making that statement? 
A No. 
Q Do you recall this question: 
"Okeh. So he was saying things like that and 
then you hit him?" 
And your answer was: 
"Yeah, 1 did hit him." 
Do you recall that? 
A No. 
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1 9 Do you recall givinp, that statenent to the 





Do you recall this question being put to you 
14, 1980: 
"Now, when you tied him up, did you put him 
in the bathroom at that time?" 1 
And your answer was: 1 
"Yes , I iii .'" 
















You do admit that you shot him though ; don't 
Yes. 
You admit that you shot Mr. Sprinkle; don't 
I only did it because Dunn said so. - 1 
Do you always shoot people because someone J 
so? 
I'm a sick man. 1 
You're a sick man? 1 
I'm a sick man in the head. 1 
How sick are you? 1 
Mighty sick. See, I don't have an education. 
I I can't read. I can't spell and can't count. 
Q 
A 
I never had 
9 
A 
Do you have a driver's license? 
I don't even have a driver's license. I've 
one in my whole life. 
Didn't you drive that motor home? 
Veil, from the gambling casino to the gas 
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station and back and that's it. 
Q *a5SBiryou recall saying to law enforcement offi-
cials on August 14th that, "The Old Man laid down and went 
to sleep and I did a little driving?" 
A Mo. 
Q Didn't you do a l i t t l e driving after the Old 
Man la id down and went to sleep? 
. A No. 
Q L-c y:i sriii Z\.J.Z tr> 1 : v a r . f c r c c r i s r . t o f f i c e r s 
on the 14th of August? 
A I told you I l i e . 
Q How much do you lie? 
A How much? 
Q Yes. 
A 1 don11 even know. 
Q Do you recall these questions and these 
answers when you were interviewed on the 14th of August: 
"Is that where the shooting took place?" 
"A Oh, it took place about five miles 
back. 
"Q Five miles back is where the Old Man 
was shot? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Now, who was driving at that time? 
"A I was driving." 
Do you recall telling the law enforcement officials 
you were driving when the Old Man was shot? 
A No. 
Q But you did tell them that; didn't you? 
A No. 
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Q Do you know a fellow by the name of Thomas 
GleffeT^M^^ 
A Thomas who? 
Q Gleffe? 
A Wo. 
Q Do you recall telling Thomas Gleffe in the 
Jail within two or three days after you were arrested that| 
the fun was yours? 
A *> 
Q You didn't tell him that? 
A No. 
Q You said a minute ago that the gun came out 
of the back pack; isn't that true? 
A It was. 
Q Mr. Dunn doesn't own a back pack; does he? 
A I call a duffle bag a back pack. It's all the 
same thing to me. 
Q But it'8 really a back pack; wasn't it? 
A What? 
Q Where the gun came out of? 
A Ho. 
Q That was a clip of the tongue; wasn't it? 
A Yes. 
Q It really came out of your back pack; didn't 
*t? 
A Ho. 
Q It didn't come out of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag; 
did It? 
A Yes. 
Q You know Creston Sickels; don't you? 
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, A Uho? 
. Q ^JaWtston S i c k e l s ? 
A Yes. 
Q You met him in the jail a number of times; 
did you not? 
A Yes. 
Q You told Creston Sickela that Dunn had nothing 
to do with the Old Man; didn't you? 
A !.:, I nL:\'z ZDII hin that. Thi-'s cr.e you're 
making up. 
Q I haven't made anything up, Mr. Scott. 
A Uh-huh. 
Q When you were gambling at Mesquite with Mr. 
Sprinkle, whose money were you gambling on? 
A He gave me a few dollars. 
Q Did you ever cash any chips in? 
A 1 cashed in a couple. 
Q A couple of dollars? 
A That's right. 
Q Did you put the change in your pocket or did 
you give it back to Mr, Sprinkle? 
A 1 put it in my pocket. 
Q How many times? 
A Once. 
Q One time? 
A Yes. 
Q How many dollars did you estimate you put in 
your pocket? 
A I don't know right offhand. 
Q $2.00? 
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A ,1 don't know right offhand. 
Q ^ B R ; many times did you cash in chips? 
- A Once. 
Q One time? Why didn't you give the money backj 
to Mr. Sprinkle when you cashed the chips in? 
A He gave me the chips, he gave me a couple of 
dollars to gamble with and he told me whatever I win I 
could stick that in my pocket and that's what I did. 
Q That's :'.;>. ;o:al yoa cashed ir., huh, v2."3? 
A Right. 
Q And when you left the Western Village Casino 
in Mesquite, did you still have the $2.00? 
A Yes. 
Q And that'8 what you had in your pocket? 
A That'8 what I had in my pocket? 
Q Yes. 
A When? 
Q When the Western Village Casino in Mesquite, 
Nevada? 
A I had a little bit more in my pockets. 
Q How much? 
A About $11.00. 
Q $11.00? 
A 0r~12, I don't know exactly. 
Q Where did you get the money? 
A Where did I get the money? 
Q Yes. 
A I was gambling In Las Vegas too. 
Q Oh, you won? 
A • Sure, I won some money. 
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Q How much? 
A ^ W o n ' t knuj. 
Q $2.00? 
A 1 don't know hov miir.li i t was. 
Q I t wasn't « t a l l i c a ; was i t? 
A If i t wafc e mi l l ion, 1 wouldn't even be here. 
Q How much did you win? 
A I don't know. 
were arrested? 
A 1 don't even know. 
Q About how much? 
A I don't know. I haven't had any money since 
I've been in jail so I don't know. 
Q Where did you get the money that you used to 
buy the gas to fill up the motor home in Mesquite? 
A The Old Man told me to RO in and inside the 
motor home, in there, there was a hundred dollar bill to 
fill one tank up. That's what I filled up and I gave him 
the change. 
Q Gave who the change? 
A I gave the Old Man the change. 
Q How much change was it? 
A About §50.00 — $75.00. 
Q Didn't you have approximately $30,00 on you, 
when you were arrested? 
A I don't know. I might have. 
Q Did you get that money out of Mr. Sprinkle's 
pocket after you shot him? 
A Hope. 
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m't know how much money I had. 
q Have you been convicted of a felony. Mr. 
sl A Once. 
J Q or twice? How many times have you been 
71 convicted of a felony? 
ol A Once that I know of. 
A
% \:':\it '-as Chat? 
A Auto theft, 
Q Where at? 
A ColoradoI 
Q Were you convicted of Armed Robbery in New 
York on two occasions? 
A Not that I can remember of. 
Q Were you convicted of Auto Theft in Baltimore, 
17 Maryland in 1969? 
18| A Yes, 
19| Q Shcplifting in Balitmore, Maryland in 1970? 1 
A Yes. 
Q Larceny in Baltimore, Maryland? 
MR. BROWN: . I object, Your Honor. I don't 
think we're limiting these felonies and I doubt that shop-
24| lifting is a felony in Baltimore, Maryland. 
' THE COURT: It's already in, Counsel. 
MR. BROWN: I know but he's claiming he 
cotmitted felonies in Baltimore, Maryland. 
THE COURT: But it's already in. 
MR. BROWN: But if he's going to continue 
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